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ABSTRACT 
Recently, Li et al. proposed a secure biometric-based remote user authentication scheme using smart 
cards to withstand the security flaws of Li-Hwang’s efficient biometric-based remote user authentication 
scheme using smart cards. Li et al.’s scheme is based on biometrics verification, smart card and one-way 
hash function, and it also uses the random nonce rather than a synchronized clock, and thus it is efficient 
in computational cost and more secure than Li-Hwang’s scheme. Unfortunately, in this paper we show 
that Li et al.’s scheme still has some security weaknesses in their design. In order to withstand those 
weaknesses in their scheme, we further propose an improvement of their scheme so that the improved 
scheme always provides proper authentication and as a result, it establishes a session key between the 
user and the server at the end of successful user authentication. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In a client/server system scenario, usually a password-based authentication scheme with smart 
card is widely used in order to identify the validity of a remote user [1], [4], [10]. Traditional 
remote identity-based authentication schemes [2], [5] are based on passwords and thus the 
security of these schemes is based on the passwords only. But, simple passwords are always 
easy to break using simple dictionary attacks [6]. Thus, to overcome such problems, 
cryptographic secret keys and passwords are suggested to be used in the remote user 
authentication schemes. However, the long and random cryptographic keys are difficult to 
memorize and hence they must be stored somewhere, and it makes expensive to maintain the 
long cryptographic keys in practice. The drawback with remote user authentication schemes 
using cryptographic keys and passwords is that they are unable to provide non-repudiation 
because cryptographic keys and passwords can be forgotten, lost or even they may be shared 
with other people and as a result there is no way to know who is the actual user. Generally, a 
secure and efficient remote user authentication scheme should meet the following conditions    
[7 ]: 
• Compatibility with a multi-server network architecture without repetitive registration. 
• Low computational workload of the smart card. 
• No need of password table or verification table. 
• Resistance to different kinds of attacks. 
• Allow the user to choose his/her identifier, password and update his/her password 
freely. 
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• Allow the users and servers to authenticate each other and then negotiate a session key 
to security communication. 
• No requirement on time synchronization and delay-time limitation. 
 
On the other hand, recent biometric-based remote user authentication schemes along with 
passwords have drawn considerable research attention [3], [6], [7], [8]. There are many 
advantages of using biometric keys (for example, fingerprints, faces, irises, hand geometry and 
palm-prints, etc.) as compared to traditional passwords, which are (as described in [6])  
• Biometric keys cannot be lost or forgotten. 
• Biometric keys are very difficult to copy or share. 
• Biometric keys are extremely hard to forge or distribute. 
• Biometric keys cannot be guessed easily. 
• Someone’s biometrics is not easy to break than others 
 
Biometric-based remote user authentications are thus inherently more reliable and secure than 
usual traditional password-based remote user authentication schemes. 
 
In 1981, Lamport first introduced the notion of remote authentication scheme [4] in which a 
remote server can authenticate a remote user based on identity and password over an insecure 
network. Lamport’s scheme requires to store the verification tables for this purpose.  Later in 
1998, Jan and Chen proposed a password-based authentication scheme [12]. However, their 
scheme does not require to store the verification tables in the system as compared with 
Lamport’s scheme. Jan and Chen’s scheme is ineffective in the sense that the server needs to 
maintain the verification tables and thus the size of the verification tables are proportional to the 
number of users. In 2000, Hwang and Li proposed a remote user authentication scheme with the 
help of smart cards [13]. Their scheme is based on ElGamal public-key cryptosystem [14]. 
Hwang and Li’s scheme does not require to store password table in the system and it only needs 
to maintain one secret key. As a result, Hwang and Li’s scheme is effective compared with [4], 
[12]. 
 
In 2002, Lee et al. proposed a fingerprint-based remote user authentication scheme using smart 
cards [15]. However, their scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attack [8], [16].  In 2004, Lin 
and Lai proposed a flexible biometric-based remote user authentication scheme [8]. Later in 
2007, Khan and Zhang showed that Lin and Lai’s scheme is insecure against the server spoofing 
attack [17]. In 2010, Li-Hwang proposed an efficient biometric-based remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards [6]. Their scheme is based on biometrics verification, 
smart card and one-way hash function, and it also uses the random nonce rather than a 
synchronized clock, and thus it is very efficient in computational cost. However, recently in 
2011, Li et al. showed that Li-Hwang’s scheme is insecure because Li-Hwang’s scheme fails to 
provide proper authentication and also it is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks [7]. 
Unfortunately, in this paper we show that Li et al.’s scheme [7] again fails to provide proper 
authentication in login and authentication phases because there is no verification on user’s 
entered password after successful verification of his/her biometric template. We also show that 
due to the same password verification problem Li et al.’s scheme fails to update the new 
password correctly of a user in password change phase. 
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review Li et al.’s biometric-
based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards [7]. We then show the security 
weaknesses in their scheme in Section 3. In Section 4, we propose an improvement of their 
scheme in order to eliminate weaknesses discussed in Section 3 and then compare performance 
and functionality of our improved scheme with Li et al.’s scheme. Finally, we conclude the 
paper in Section 5. 
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2. REVIEW OF LI ET AL.’S BIOMETRIC-BASED REMOTE USER 
AUTHENTICATION SCHEME 
In this section, for a detailed analysis we review in brief Li et al.’s efficient biometric-based 
remote user authentication scheme [7]. The notations used throughout this paper are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Notations used in this paper. 
 
A one-way hash function lh }1,0{}1,0{: * → takes an arbitrary-length input *}1,0{∈X , and 
produces a fixed-length (say, l -bits) output lXh }1,0{)( ∈ , called the message digest. The hash 
function is the fingerprint of a file, a message, or other data blocks, and has the following 
attributes [11]. 
• X can be applied to a data block of all sizes. 
• For any given variable )(, XhX is easy to operate, enabling easy implementation in 
software and hardware. 
• The output length of )(Xh is fixed. 
• Deriving X from the given value )(XhY = and the given hash function )(⋅h is 
computationally infeasible. 
• For any given variable X , finding any XY ≠ so that )()( XhYh = is computationally 
infeasible. 
• Finding a pair of inputs ),( YX , with YX ≠ , so that )()( YhXh = is computationally 
infeasible. 
 
The hash functions have many applications in the field of cryptology and information security, 
notably in digital signatures, message authentication codes (MACs), and other form of 
authentications and thus it becomes the basis of many cryptographic protocols. One of the 
fundamental properties of hash functions is that the outputs are very sensitive to small 
perturbations in their inputs and in general, those cryptographic hash functions cannot be 
applied straightforwardly when the input data with noisy such as biometrics [9]. If there are few 
differences between the input each time and this situation will cause the legal user unable to 
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pass biometric authentication. As in [7], we also use the biometric template matching to perform 
the biometric authentication in our improved scheme. 
 
Li et al.’s scheme consists of the following four phases, namely, registration phase, login phase, 
authentication phase and password change phase. 
 
2.1. Registration Phase 
Before the remote user iC  logins to the system, iC  needs to perform the following steps: 
• Step 1: iC  chooses a random number N  and computes the masked password 
)||( ii PWNhRPW =  based on his/her password iPW . iC  then enters his/her personal 
biometrics iB  on the specific device and provides his/her masked password iRPW , the 
identity iID  of iC  to the registration center, R via a secure channel. 
• Step 2: After receiving the information in Step 1, R  computes ir  and ie  as 
)||( iii fRPWhr = and isii rXIDhe ⊕= )||( , where )( ii Bhf = . 
• Step 3: R  stores )),(,,( yhef ii ⋅ on iC ’s smart card and sends it to iC via secure 
channel. 
• Step 4: iC also enters N into his/her smart card. 
 
2.2. Login Phase 
When the user iC wants to login to the remote server iS , he/she needs to perform the following 
steps: 
• Step 1: User iC  first inserts his/her smart card into the card reader and provides his/her  
personal biometrics iB  on the specific device to verify the user’s biometrics. If the 
biometrics information matches the template stored in the system,  iC  passes the 
biometric verification and then performs the following steps. 
• Step 2: iC  now inputs his/her password iPW  and identity iID . After receiving iC ’s 
iID  and iPW  the smart card computes )||(),||( iiiii fRPWhrPWNhRPW =′= , 
cii RMMreM ⊕=′⊕= 121 , , where cR is a random number generated by the user, 
).||||(,),||( 4325343 MMMhMMRPWMRyhM ic =⊕==  
• Step 3: Finally, iC  sends the message ),,,( 542 MMMIDi  to server iS . 
 
2.3. Authentication Phase 
Once the request login message ),,,( 542 MMMIDi  from the user iC is received, the remote 
server iS  and the user iC perform the following steps for mutual authentication. 
• Step 1: iS  first checks the format of iID . If it is valid, iS  then computes 
)||(,),||( 786276 MyhMMMMXIDhM si =⊕== and then  verifies whether 
)||||( 4825 MMMhM = . If it holds, iS  stores ),( 7MID i in its database. Thus, 
when iS received the next iC ’s login message, iS  computes 7M ′ and compares with 
the stored 7M in the database. If these values are same, iS  rejects it because it is a 
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replay message. Otherwise, iS replaces the old 7M by the new computed 7M ′ . This 
method resists the replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks compared to Li-
Hwang’s scheme [6]. 
• Step 2: If Step 1 does not hold, iS  rejects the login request and terminates the session. 
Otherwise, iS  accepts the login request and thus iC  is authenticated by iS  as a valid 
user. iS  then computes ,)||||(, 8910849 si RMySIDMhMMMM ⊕⊕=⊕=  
),||||||( 9611 sRyMMhM = where sR is a random number chosen by iS . iS  sends 
the message ),( 1110 MM to iC . 
• Step 3: Upon receiving the message in Step 2, iC  then computes 
10312 )||||( MMySIDRPWhM ii ⊕⊕=  and goes for verification of the equality 
)||||||( 12111 MyRPWMhM i= . If this verification holds good, the validity of iS  is 
authenticated by iC . Otherwise, iC terminates the scheme. 
• Step 4: After mutual authentication phase, the user iC  and the server iS  compute their 
session key SK as )||||||( 123 ii SIDMMRPWhSK =  (by iC ) and 
)||||||( 89 is SIDRMMhSK = (by iS ). 
 
2.4. Password Change Phase 
To freely change the existing password iPW of a user iC  by a new password 
new
iPW , the user 
iC does the following steps. 
 
iC  first inserts his/her smart card into the card reader and provides his/her personal biometrics 
iB on the specific device to verify the user’s biometrics. If this verification passes, the user 
iC enters his/her old password iPW  and new password 
new
iPW . After that, the smart card 
performs the following operations: )||( ii PWNhWRP =′ , )||( iii fWRPhr ′=′ , iii ree ′⊕=′ , 
where )( ii Bhf = , )||( newinewi PWNhRPW = , )||( inewii fRPWhr =′′ and iinewi ree ′′⊕′= . 
After these operations, the value of ie is replaced by the new calculated value of 
new
ie in the 
smart card. 
  
3. CRYPTANALYSIS OF LI ET AL.’S BIOMETRIC-BASED REMOTE USER 
AUTHENTICATION SCHEME 
In this section, we show that the Li et al.’s scheme [7] has the following security weaknesses in 
their design. 
 
 
3.1. Li et al.’s Scheme fails to provide strong authentication in Login and 
Authentication Phases 
From login phase of Li et al.’s scheme, it is noted that user iC first enters his/her personal 
biometrics on the specific device to verify whether his/her biometrics passes or not. If this 
verification passes, then iC  enters his/her password iPW and identity iID . In both Li-Hwang’s 
scheme [6] and Li et al.’s scheme [7], it is assumed that the user iC  always enters his/her 
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password  iPW  correctly.  There is no verification on entered password iPW  in login phase. In 
practice, a user keeps different passwords for different purposes. Even if the user iC enters 
his/her password incorrectly by mistake, both the login and authentication phases still continue. 
Finally, at the end of authentication phase, iS rejects iC ’s login request and as a result, we have 
unnecessarily extra communication and computational overheads during login and 
authentication phases. In such scenario, the user iC is totally unaware of the fact that he/she has 
entered his/her password incorrectly in login phase. 
 
In our cryptanalysis, we assume that the user iC enters his/her password incorrectly by mistake 
and let the entered password be  )( ii PWWP ≠′ . Then from the login phase, it follows that 
 
).||)||((
)||)||((
)||(
),||(
)||(
ii
ii
iii
i
ii
fPWNhh
fWPNhh
fWRPhr
PWNh
WPNhWRP
≠
′=
′=′
≠
′=′
 
 
As a result, we have the following computations: 
),||(
)||)||(()||)||(()||(
1
si
iiiisi
ii
XIDh
fWPNhhfPWNhhXIDh
reM
≠
′⊕⊕=
′⊕=
 
,)||(
)||)||(()||)||(()||(
12
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ciiiisi
c
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RfWPNhhfPWNhhXIDh
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=
 
After sending the message ),,,( 542 MMMIDi  to iS  by iC , the server iS  will compute 
7M and 8M incorrectly in authentication phase after verifying the format of iID , because  
.
)||()||(
),(
627
6
c
sicsi
si
R
XIDhRXIDh
MMM
XIDhM
≠
⊕⊕≠
⊕=
⊕=
 
Thus, we have, 
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.3, No.2, March 2011 
19 
 
),||(
),||( 78
cRyh
MyhM
≠
=
 
and hence, when iS compares 5M  with )||||( 482 MMMh , it is obvious that  
).||||( 4825 MMMhM ≠  
iS does not store ),( 7MIDi  in the database and it rejects the login request and terminates the 
session. Thus, iC is not authenticated as a valid user by iS . Here the user iC is not notified that 
he/she has entered his/her password incorrectly in login phase. 
 
3.2. Li et al.’s Scheme fails to update properly User’s new password locally in 
Password Change Phase 
In Li et al.’s biometric-based remote user authentication scheme, any user iC  can freely change 
his/her old password by the new password locally without the help of the registration center R . 
However, in their scheme only the verification of biometrics of user iC takes place and in case 
the verification passes, iC is allowed to input his/her old password 
old
iPW  and new password 
new
iPW .  Since there is no verification of old password in their scheme, the updation of new 
password will take place incorrectly if the user iC  enters his/her old password 
old
iPW  wrongly. 
 
In order to update the new password, Li et al.’s scheme does the following steps after successful 
verification of user’s biometric template iB . We assume that the user iC  enters his/her old 
password oldiPW  incorrectly so that 
old
ii PWPW ≠ . 
 
We then have, 
 
).||(
)||)||(()||)||(()||(
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As a result, we have the following result, 
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isi
ii
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i
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The smart card replaces ie  with 
new
ie  in its memory. Obviously, in such scenario the new 
password of user iC  will not be updated correctly in the smart card. We see that due to this 
problem, when the user logins later in the system providing his/her biometrics as well as new 
password newiPW , the login request of the user is always rejected by iS even if in that time the 
user enters new password correctly. This effect also continues in subsequent password change 
phases by the user iC . Thus, to overcome from this serious problem the only solution is to issue 
a new smart card with necessary information from the user iC ’s fresh identity and masked 
password provided to the registration server R . 
 
 
4. THE PROPOSED IMPROVED SCHEME 
In this section, we propose an improvement based on Li et al.’s biometric-based remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards. The improved scheme keeps the merit of the original 
Li et al.’s scheme and can withstand the original scheme’s security weaknesses discussed in 
Section 3. 
 
4.1. Description of the Improved Scheme 
We discuss the registration, login, authentication and password change phases of our proposed 
scheme. 
 
4.1.1. Registration Phase 
When the remote user authentication scheme starts, the user iC  and the registration center R  
need to perform the following steps: 
• Step 1: iC  chooses a random number N  and computes the masked password 
)||( ii PWNhRPW =  based on his/her password iPW . iC  enters his/her personal 
biometrics iB  on the specific device and provides his/her masked password iRPW , the 
identity iID  of iC  to the registration center, R via a secure channel. 
• Step 2: After receiving the above information in Step 1, the registration center R  
computes ir  and ie  as )||( iii fRPWhr = and isii rXIDhe ⊕= )||( , where 
)( ii Bhf = . 
• Step 3: R  stores )),(,,,( yherf iii ⋅ on iC ’s smart card and sends it to iC via secure 
channel. 
• Step 4: Finally, iC enters N into his/her smart card. 
It is noted that in our improved scheme, the extra information ir  is stored in the user’s smart 
card compared with Li et al.’s scheme. The registration phase is summarized in Figure 1. 
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Fig. 1.  Registration phase of the proposed scheme. 
 
4.1.2. Login Phase 
When the user iC wants to login to the remote server iS , he/she needs to perform the following 
steps: 
• Step 1: User iC  first inserts his/her smart card into the card reader and provides his/her  
personal biometrics iB  on the specific device to verify the user’s biometrics iB . If the 
biometrics information matches the template stored in the system, iC  passes the 
biometric verification and then performs the following steps. 
• Step 2: iC  inputs his/her password iPW  and identity iID . After receiving iC ’s iID  
and iPW  the smart card computes )||(),||( iiiii fRPWhrPWNhRPW =′= . 
• Step 3: The smart card then checks whether ii rr ′= . If this verification does not hold, 
this means that the user iC enters his/her password incorrectly. The user is notified with 
the incorrect password error message and the scheme terminates. 
• Step 4: Otherwise, if ii rr ′= , then only the smart card computes 
cii RMMreM ⊕=′⊕= 121 , , where cR is a random number generated by the user, 
).||||(,),||( 4325343 MMMhMMRPWMRyhM ic =⊕==  
• Step 5: Finally, iC  sends the message 〉〈 5432 ,,,, MMMMIDi  to server iS . 
 
The login phase is summarized in Figure 2. 
 
4.1.3. Authentication Phase 
After receiving the request login message 〉〈 5432 ,,,, MMMMIDi  from the user iC , the 
remote server iS  and the user iC perform the following steps for mutual authentication. 
• Step 1: iS  first checks the format of iID . If it is valid, iS  then computes 
)||(,),||( 786276 MyhMMMMXIDhM si =⊕== and then  verifies whether  
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.3, No.2, March 2011 
22 
 
.38 MM =  If it holds, then iS  further verifies whether )||||( 4825 MMMhM = . If 
it holds, iS  stores ),( 7MID i in its database. Thus, when iS received the next iC ’s 
login message, iS  computes 7M ′ and compares with the stored 7M in the database. If 
these values are same, iS  rejects it because it is a replay message. Otherwise, 
iS replaces the old 7M by the new computed 7M ′ . This method resists the replay 
attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks compared to Li-Hwang’s scheme [6]. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Login phase of the proposed scheme. 
 
• Step 2: If Step 1 does not hold, this means that iC  is not legitimate and hence, iS  
rejects the login request and terminates the session. Otherwise, iS  accepts the login 
request and thus iC  is authenticated by iS  as a valid user. iS  then computes 
,849 MMM ⊕= ,)||||( 8910 si RMySIDMhM ⊕⊕= ),||(11 sRyhM =
),||||||( 9612 sRyMMhM = where sR is a random number chosen by iS . iS  sends 
the message 〉〈 121110 ,, MMM to iC . 
• Step 3: After receiving the message in Step 2, iC  then computes 
10313 )||||( MMySIDRPWhM ii ⊕⊕= . iC  computes ),||( 1314 MyhM = and 
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verifies whether .1114 MM =  If it holds, then  iC  further goes for verification of the 
equality )||||||( 13112 MyRPWMhM i= . If this verification holds good, the validity 
of iS  is authenticated by iC . Otherwise, iC terminates the scheme. 
• Step 4: After mutual authentication phase, the user iC  computes the session key 
SK shared with the server iS as )||||||( 133 ii SIDMMRPWhSK = . The server  iS  
also computes the same session key SK shared with the user iC  as 
)||||||( 89 is SIDRMMhSK = . 
 
The authentication phase is summarized in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Authentication phase of the proposed scheme. 
 
4.1.4. Password Change Phase 
In Li et al.’s scheme a user can freely change his/her password locally without contacting the 
registration center. In their scheme, only after the successful biometric template verification, 
even if the user enters by mistake his/her old password wrongly the value of ie  is still updated, 
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which is incorrect. Thus, in next time when the user wants to login in the system, the user’s 
login request will be rejected by the server even the user enters his/her new changed password 
correctly in that time. 
 
In this phase, we show that in our improved scheme the above mentioned situation will never 
happen because the smart card always verifies the old entered password by the user before 
updating the new changed password. The password change phase consists of the following 
steps: 
• Step 1: iC enters the smart card into the card reader and offers his/her personal 
biometrics iB on the specific device. If the biometric information matches the template 
stored in system, iC  passes the biometric verification, and iC performs the following 
steps. 
• Step 2: iC  enters his/her old password 
old
iPW and new changed password 
new
iPW . 
• Step 3: The smart card then computes the following: 
      ).||(),||( iiioldii fWRPhrPWNhWRP ′=′=′  
             If ii rr ≠′ , it means that iC  enters his/her old password incorrectly and the password  
              change phase is terminated. 
• Step 4: On the other hand, if ii rr =′ , then only the smart card computes 
       
).||()||(
),||(
),||(
),||(
)||(
i
new
isi
iii
i
new
ii
new
i
new
i
si
iisi
iii
fRPWhXIDh
ree
fRPWhr
PWNhRPW
XIDh
rrXIDh
ree
⊕=
′′⊕′=′′
=′′
=
=
′⊕⊕=
′⊕=′
 
 
• Step 5: Finally, replace ie  with ie ′′ and ir with ir ′′  in the smart card. 
 
We note that in the proposed scheme not only the  ie  is replaced with ie ′′  in the smart card, but 
also the ir  is replaced with ir ′′  in the smart card as compared with Li et al.’s scheme. 
 
 
4.2. Analysis of the Improved Scheme 
In this section, we discuss the security features of the proposed scheme and then compare the 
performances of the proposed scheme with those for Li et al.’s scheme [7]. 
 
4.2.1. Security Analysis 
The proposed scheme resists the man-in-the-middle attacks as in Li et al.’s scheme, because the 
proposed scheme also retains the merit of the original Li et al.’s scheme. We discuss in the 
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following the security features of our proposed scheme with respect to stolen smart card attacks, 
strong mutual authentication, replay attacks, security of session key and security of secret key. 
• Resist stolen smart card attacks Suppose the user’s smart card has been lost or stolen 
and the attacker can breach the information ),),(,,,,( NyherfID iiii ⋅ which are stored 
in the smart card. Now knowing ),||)||(( iii fPWNhhr =  where )( ii Bhf = and 
,)||( isii rXIDhe ⊕= the attacker can compute .)||( iisi reXIDh ⊕=  However, due 
to properties of one-way hash function )(⋅h it is computationally infeasible to compute 
the master secret key sX  from the exacted ).||( si XIDh  Again, the attacker cannot get 
the user’s password iPW  from )||)||(( iii fPWNhhr = due to properties of one-way 
hash function )(⋅h . Besides, it is difficult for the attacker to pass the biometrics 
verification and so the attacker cannot derive or change the user’s password iPW . 
Moreover, the password iPW  is unknown to the registration center R . As a result, the 
proposed scheme can resist insider attacks. 
 
• Strong mutual authentication In the login phase, while constructing ii reM ′⊕=1 the 
smart card always verifies the user’s entered password. If the password verification 
passes, iC sends the message 〉〈 5432 ,,,, MMMMIDi  to server iS . iS  then checks 
the validity of user’s ID, iID , and computes ,),||( 6276 MMMXIDhM si ⊕==  
)||()||( 78 cRyhMyhM == . iS  can authenticate iC  by verifying equations 
38 MM = and )||||( 4825 MMMhM = . If these hold good (since the user’s 
password is authenticated in the login phase), iC  is a valid user.  Since the 
authentication relies on the one-way hash function )(⋅h , any fabricated message 
〉′′′′〈 5432 ,,,, MMMMIDi  cannot pass the authentication procedure in the proposed 
scheme. Similarly, when iS  sends the message 〉〈 121110 ,, MMM  to iC , iC  then 
computes 10313 )||||( MMySIDRPWhM ii ⊕⊕= . iC  also computes 
),||( 1314 MyhM =  and verifies whether 1114 MM =  holds or not. If it holds, then iC  
further goes for verification of the equality )||||||( 13112 MyRPWMhM i= . If this 
verification holds good, the validity of iS  is authenticated by iC . Otherwise, iC  
terminates the scheme. Also, for the same reason any fabricated message 
〉′′′〈 121110 ,, MMM  cannot pass the authentication procedure in the proposed scheme. 
So, the proposed scheme provides strong mutual authentication. 
 
• Resist replay attacks In our scheme, an attacker may try to attempt to pretend to be a 
valid user to login the server by sending messages previously transmitted by a legal 
user. However, the proposed scheme uses random nonces and it also compares 7M  
value in its database to withstand the replay attacks. Since the random nonces cR  and 
sR  are generated by the user and server independently, and both values are distinct due 
to random selection in each session, an attacker has no way to successfully replay used 
messages. 
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• Security of secret key In our proposed scheme, as in [7] there are two pieces of secret 
information used: the master secret key sX  is shared between R  and iS , and the 
secret number y which is maintained by iS and stored in the user’s smart card. In order 
to derive 
sX  and y  from the transmitted messages 〉〈 5432 ,,,, MMMMIDi  and 
〉〈 121110 ,, MMM , it is computationally infeasible problem due to one-way properties 
of the hash function )(⋅h . Hence, there is no way for an attacker to compute the secret 
session key SK  shared between iC and iS . 
 
 
• Security of session key  
 
- Known-key secrecy It means that if an attacker is able to compromise one session key, 
that does not lead to compromise other session keys. Assume that the attacker has the 
session key )||||||( 133 ii SIDMMRPWhSK =  )||||||( 89 is SIDRMMh= . Now 
this session key is associated with the random nonces cR , sR , the masked password of 
user )||( ii PWNhRPW = and the secret number y . It is noted that all these values are 
protected by the one-way hash function )(⋅h . Hence, even if the attacker compromises a 
past session key , he/she cannot compute the random nonces cR , sR , the masked 
password of user )||( ii PWNhRPW = and the secret number y  from the 
compromised session key and thus, he/she cannot derive other session keys. 
 
 
- Forward secrecy This means that if somehow the master key of the system is 
compromised, the secrecy of the previously established session keys should not be 
affected. Now, if the master secret key sX  is compromised for some reasons, the 
attacker cannot compute any previously established secret keys without having 
)||( ii PWNhRPW = , y  and sR . Hence, as in [7] the proposed scheme also provides 
forward secrecy. 
 
 
4.2.2. Functionality Analysis 
Functionality comparison of our improved scheme with Li et al.’s scheme is shown in Table 2. 
Due to computational efficiency of hash function, both our scheme and Li et al.’s scheme are 
very efficient in computation. The proposed scheme provides strong authentication by verifying 
user’s personal biometrics, password, and random nonces generated by the user and server as 
compared to that for Li et al.’s scheme. Besides this advantage, the proposed scheme supports 
changing password by the user locally without the help of registration center and updates 
always correctly the new password replacing the old password in the smart card as compared to 
that for Li et al.’s scheme. The proposed scheme only requires additional storage requirement 
due to storing ir  in the memory of the smart card compared with Li et al.’s scheme. Due to 
computational efficiency of the hash function )(⋅h  our scheme is also efficient as in Li et al.’s 
scheme. Moreover, the proposed scheme supports other functionality as in Li et al.’s scheme. 
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Table 2. Functionality comparison between our proposed scheme and Li et al.’s scheme 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have shown that Li et al.’s scheme fails to provide strong authentication in 
both login and authentication phases. We have further shown that Li et al.’s scheme fails to 
update properly the user’s changed password locally without the help of the registration center. 
We have then proposed an improvement of Li et al.’s biometric-based remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards in order to withstand the above security weaknesses in 
their scheme. The proposed scheme also keeps the merit of the original Li et al.’s scheme. Our 
proposed scheme provides strong authentication with the help of verifying biometrics, 
passwords and random nonces generated by the user and server as compared to that for Li et 
al.’s scheme. Further, the proposed scheme always updates the new password correctly in the 
smart card changed by the user freely without the help of registration center.  
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